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The disaster in Norilsk 
as the tip of the iceberg
The oil spill in Norilsk was caused by depressuri-
sation of a storage tank with diesel fuel, which 
is used by the power station as a backup fuel. 
According to Norilsk Nickel itself (one of the 
world’s biggest producers of non-ferrous metals), 
the disaster resulted from subsidence of the tank’s 
foundations due to the thawing of permafrost. 
However, according to local residents and environ-
mental activists, the tank’s corrosion and very poor 
state of repair were the reasons behind the inci-
dent. The resulting environmental pollution was 
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The end of May 2020 saw the biggest known environmental disaster in the Russian Arctic. The thermal 
power plant in Norilsk in Krasnoyarsk Krai, controlled by the Norilsk Nickel company, contaminated soil 
and water with more than 21,000 tons of diesel fuel. A month later, the company dumped another 
portion of toxic substances directly onto the tundra. Although the company has been polluting the 
region for years, it has thus far remained unpunished. This case illustrates the costs of Russia’s status 
as a major raw commodity exporter and of Moscow’s policy of exploitation of remote regions, which 
resembles colonial practices. In these regions, natural resources are being mined in a manner close 
to over-exploitation, without the necessary protection measures, and the health of the local popula-
tion is being put at serious risk. Moscow accumulates the income earned from selling the mined raw 
materials and at the same time it ignores the interests of local residents – all matters concerning 
the regions are decided in the capital, frequently behind the scenes, and the regional governments 
are informed of the decisions afterwards. The Kremlin allows mining companies to operate freely 
in the regions (including with regards to environmental issues) in exchange for contributions to 
the state budget and profits for members of the elite associated with President Putin. This practice 
makes residents of distant regions feel abused and is a source of resentment towards the federal 
government in Moscow, which is particularly acute in Siberia and the Russian Far East and results 
in occasional protests. Meanwhile, a genuine fight against environmental pollution requires major 
and long-term outlays on modernisation. However, Russia’s financial problems and its political and 
economic model as a whole, particularly the lack of ownership rights protection, constitute major 
barriers to these investments. 
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aggravated by a belated clean-up operation, which 
was launched at least two days later. As a con-
sequence, a portion of the oil likely got into the 
Kara Sea. Even though the company took meas-
ures to mitigate the effects of the disaster, it was 
only following an intervention by President Putin 
that a large-scale operation was launched. Due 
to difficult geographical conditions and the ab-
sence of transportation routes, eliminating all the 
consequences of the disaster may not be possible. 
A state of emergency was declared in the region, 
representatives of the company’s executive body 
travelled to Norilsk, and the company’s co-owner 
Vladimir Potanin, permanently residing in Mos-
cow, reported the details of the situation directly 
to the president. The Federal Service for Super-
vision of Natural Resources (Rosprirodnadzor) 
opened an investigation into the causes of the 
disaster (the Service’s head flew to Norilsk on 
a private jet owned by Norilsk Nickel to carry out 
an on-the-spot inspection). Local activists accused 
Rosprirodnadzor of showing leniency to the com-
pany, including its failure to carry out inspections 
of the waters of the Kara Sea and the rivers flowing 
into it. In addition, the Service took Norilsk Nickel’s 
declarations that the spilt fuel had not reached the 
Kara Sea at face value. However, this contradicted 
the eye-witness reports provided by fishermen. 
On 6 July 2020, Rosprirodnadzor estimated the 
environmental damage caused by the disaster at 
around US$ 2 billion (the costs of the clean-up 
operation itself stood at around US$ 150 million). 
The company is expected to voluntarily transfer 
this amount to the federal budget. A fine of such 
magnitude is without precedent in Russia. 
Although the scale of the environmental disaster 
caused by the oil spill is unprecedented, it is noth-
ing exceptional as regards the operation of Norilsk 
Nickel. Due to the company’s persistent emission 
of toxic substances (mainly sulphur dioxide) into 
the atmosphere, Norilsk is among Russia’s top 
most polluted cities.1 In the Kola Peninsula (near 
Russia’s border with Norway), where the company 
mines its nickel, high levels of sulphur dioxide 
emission have been the subject of a long-running 
Russian-Norwegian dispute.2 In addition, the river 
Daldykan, recently contaminated by the fuel from 
the damaged storage tank, turns red each year as 
a result of the company pumping out its industrial 
wastewater (in 2016, when the volume of this 
wastewater was exceptionally large, the company 
was ordered to pay a nominal fine of US$ 10,000).3 
It is worth noting that the activity which resulted 
in environmental contamination was not halted 
even during the clean-up operation following the 
oil spill, or whilst under pressure from Moscow- 
-based services, which showed increased interest 
in the incident. At the beginning of July 2020, 
a journalist of the opposition newspaper “Novaya 
Gazeta”, backed by local environmental activists, 
revealed an illegal pumping station discharging 
industrial wastewater from the company’s tank 
directly onto the tundra. The company explained 
that this was an emergency discharge due to el-
evated water levels – an explanation which was 
accepted by Rosprirodnadzor.4
Predatory exploitation in exchange 
for serving the Kremlin
Norilsk Nickel regularly polluting the environment 
is an excellent example of predatory exploitation 
of outlying regions by Moscow and by Russian 
companies, which resembles colonial practices. 
The Taymyr Peninsula, which is where Norilsk is 
located, is extremely rich in non-ferrous metals – 
Norilsk Nickel provides 35% of the global produc-
tion of palladium, 25% of platinum, 20% of nickel 
1 ‘Список городов России с наибольшим уровнем 
загрязнения атмосферного воздуха’, Федеральное 
государственное бюджетное учреждение «Главная 
геофизическая обсерватория им. А.И. Воейкова», 
www.voeikovmgo.ru.
2 T. Nilsen, ‘Norway’s enviro minister brings dispute on 
cross-border pollution to Moscow’, The Barents Observer, 
30 January 2019, www.thebarentsobserver.com.
3 ‘Завод в Норильске оштрафовали за красную реку’, 
NGS24, 31 October 2016, www.ngs24.ru.
4 Е. Костюченко, Ю. Козырев, ‘Ржавчина. Как «Норникель» 
перерабатывает Таймыр в чистую прибыль’, Новая 
газета, 14 July 2020, www.novayagazeta.ru.
The environmental disaster in the 
Taymyr Peninsula results from many 
years of predatory exploitation of Rus-
sian regions which are rich in natural 
resources.
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and 10% of cobalt. The history of this region is the 
history of intensive exploitation of both nature and 
humans. Just as for many other mining towns and 
cities, Norilsk first emerged as part of the Gulag 
(a Soviet-era network of forced labour camps), was 
later transformed into an industrial plant (built by 
the camp prisoners), and subsequently turned into 
a city based around the plant (the city itself was 
also built using prison labour).5 At present, Siberia 
and the Russian Far East continue to be regions 
affected by predatory exploitation. Raw materials 
mined there are exported abroad at substantial 
profit that accrues to Moscow, where it also ends 
up in private bank accounts belonging to members 
of the narrow political and business elite. Despite 
the fact that they are rich in natural resources and 
bear the environmental costs of their mining, the 
regions merely receive a minor portion of this rev-
enue. In addition, Russian companies are cutting 
back their investment in environmental protection 
and in production facilities to a bare minimum 
(the operation of Norilsk Nickel largely depends on 
infrastructure built back in the Soviet era) to obtain 
the maximum profit in the shortest term possible. 
To a large degree, this is related to the tenuous 
nature of ownership rights: in Russia even the big-
gest oligarchs cannot be certain about the future 
of their business activity, given their awareness of 
what happened to Yukos and to other oligarchs 
who were stripped of their assets. At Norilsk Nickel, 
a dispute over the company’s ownership structure 
has been ongoing for several years between its 
biggest stakeholders: Vladimir Potanin and Oleg 
Deripaska, which gives Moscow useful leverage 
for influencing either of them. The Kremlin even 
took over control of the company for some time, 
acting as a mediator.6
Norilsk Nickel is not the only company to be 
involved in these practices. Rusal, one of the 
world’s biggest aluminium producers, controlled 
by Deripaska, operates in a similar way. Achinsk 
in Krasnoyarsk Krai, the company’s base for min-
ing bauxite, and Bratsk in Irkutsk oblast, where 
5 Ibid.
6 А. Калмыков, ‘Война в “Норникеле”: Дерипаска выиграл 
у Потанина первую битву в лондонском суде’, BBC News 
Русская служба, 27 June 2018, www.bbc.com/russian.
a processing plant is located, are among Russia’s 
most polluted cities.
However, the greatest polluter is the oil and 
gas sector. It pollutes the environment at every 
stage of its production activities – during mining 
(the main source of pollution is gas flaring in the 
field) and transport (pipeline failures), and during 
fuel processing and its utilisation by end users 
(emission of fumes into the atmosphere). In spite 
of the major investments carried out by the sec-
tor over the last decade, this situation remains 
unchanged. The main purpose of the investments 
was to reduce the financial losses Russia had suf-
fered in connection with gas flaring in so-called 
flares (stacks used for burning excess gas in gas 
fields during extraction). According to estimates 
prepared in 2012 by Russia’s Ministry of Natural 
Resources and the Environment, losses suffered 
as a result of gas flaring amounted to around 
US$ 12 billion. Despite these investments, Russia 
continues to be the world’s top gas flaring country.
The biggest polluters, such as Gazprom, Norilsk 
Nickel and especially oil companies are allowed 
by the state to operate freely due to their impor-
tance to the federal budget. In addition, they 
enable the Kremlin’s elite to earn major profits 
under corruption schemes devised by themselves. 
Frequently, the Kremlin uses these companies as 
an instrument in its foreign policy and as a source 
of funding for its various projects – Potanin and 
Deripaska, for example, funded the 2014 Winter 
Olympics in Sochi. These companies are in fact 
responsible for the economic, political and social 
stability of “their” regions, which they control 
as virtual fiefdoms. Members of the local au-
thorities are recruited from among individuals 
associated with Norilsk Nickel (Norilsk’s mayor 
used to work as manager for Norilsk Nickel) and 
The Kremlin allows the mining com-
panies to operate freely, disregard-
ing the need for basic environmental 
protection, in exchange for transfer-
ring large contributions to the central 
budget and enabling the Kremlin’s 
elite to profit from this.
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most of the city’s residents are employed by the 
company. Therefore, they refrain from criticising it, 
for fear of losing their livelihood. The company’s 
security services, for their part, monitor citizens’ 
activity (they follow their posts on social media) 
and issue permissions for the transport of water 
and soil samples collected in the city to other 
locations. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
company earmarked around US$ 300 million for 
support initiatives carried out in those regions in 
which it has its branches. For these regions, this 
represented a major cash injection. This model 
of relationship between the Kremlin and large 
companies is beneficial to both sides. In 2019, 
Norilsk Nickel’s revenue amounted to more than 
US$ 13.5 billion, and its dividend was almost US$ 
5 billion (Potanin is currently Russia’s most afflu-
ent oligarch). In addition, the company is among 
the biggest contributors to the budget of Krasno-
yarsk Krai. For the residents of these regions, the 
higher salaries offered by these companies serve 
as a form of compensation for enduring harsh 
weather and environmental conditions. These 
salaries are 50% higher than the Russian average, 
although in recent years this difference has been 
shrinking and the cost of living in Norilsk is high 
– it is close to Moscow standards.
Awareness changes and 
the “new protest”
The environmental disaster in Norilsk, revealed 
on Russian social media, stirred up emotions na-
tionwide. In June, it hit the headlines in the local 
and foreign media alike. This strong response 
seems to have been caused by Russian society 
becoming increasingly sensitive to environmental 
issues as an element of their quality of life. These 
problems are increasingly becoming a matter of 
public concern, and inciting debates and even 
protests. They also provoke reactions from foreign 
governments and international environmental 
organisations.7 Commonly, high-level state of-
ficials only intervene when the media spotlight 
7 Including the protest organised in 2013 by Greenpeace activ-
ists on the Arctic Sunrise ship against Russian oil exploration 
in the Arctic. See S. Golubok, D. Simons, ‘Arctic 30 jailed 
in Russia argue their case in European Court’, Greenpeace, 
12 July 2018, www.greenpeace.org/international.
or public concern becomes too glaring to ignore, 
just as in the case of Norilsk, in which President 
Putin was forced to react.
This shift seems to have partly been caused by 
changes in awareness within Russian society, 
which in turn stem from an improvement in living 
standards of some segments of society (compared 
with standards in the 1990s) and from processes 
associated with economic, technological and cul-
tural globalisation. Society’s increasing aspirations 
stretch beyond meeting the bare necessities and 
include issues such as environmental care, life-
style choices and personal dignity. These have 
become important for increasingly wide groups 
of citizens, not only affluent residents of big cities. 
Environmental issues have gained prominence 
with a wider audience, due to the fact that they 
have been emphasised by Russia’s most popular 
bloggers, YouTubers and oppositionists. Their on-
line programs and podcasts are nearly as popular 
as television news broadcasts.8 Environmental 
issues are increasingly becoming the subject of 
street protests. For more than a year, Moscow 
oblast saw a series of “waste protests”, during 
which local residents demanded that the prob-
lems associated with landfills emitting toxic gases 
and contaminating the groundwater should be 
eliminated. The landfill operators included compa-
nies linked to the Kremlin, which earned sizeable 
profits from this line of business. These initiatives 
attracted average citizens, who were hitherto loyal 
to the government and had stayed out of protests, 
rather than “career” oppositionists and activists.9 
8 See, for example, YouTube channels run by Yuri Dud, Irina 
Shykhman, projects such as Redaktsya, StalinGulag etc. – 
broadcasts and videos published by them generate be-
tween several hundred thousand and 4–6 million views 
(Yuri Dud’s film “Kolyma” about Stalinist era repressions 
had a staggering 21 million views).
9 J. Rogoża, ‘A stinking business. Environmental issues, pro-
tests and big money in the waste business in Russia’, OSW 
Commentary, no. 283, 27 August 2018, www.osw.waw.pl.
A strong public response to the 
disaster illustrates how awareness 
is changing in Russia and signals 
society’s increasing sensitivity to 
environmental issues.
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Another protest that attracted media attention 
concerned the construction of a landfill in Shiyes 
in Arkhangelsk oblast in northern Russia. Plans had 
been made to transport large amounts of waste 
from Moscow and other cities to this site. In the 
wake of a long protest in this region, the authori-
ties ultimately cancelled this multi-million rouble 
investment. This unexpected success on the part 
of protesters was widely reported across Russia.
It is worth noting that – contrary to popular be-
lief – the biggest protests held in Russia in recent 
years were triggered by environmental and politi-
cal problems, rather than by economic issues or 
poverty. Electoral and anti-corruption rallies or-
ganised by Alexei Navalny attracted several dozen 
thousand attendees, just as the current protest 
by residents of Khabarovsk (a city of 600,000 
inhabitants) in the Russian Far East against the dis-
missal of the local governor. Similarly, the “waste” 
protests were attended by large numbers of in-
dividuals and are ongoing. This shows a gradual 
change in how some citizens are approaching 
matters that were, until recently, viewed merely 
in Russia as ‘first world problems’.
A staged reaction from the authorities
The reaction from the media and society has 
forced the Kremlin and President Putin himself to 
become directly involved in the fight against the 
environmental disaster in Norilsk. The fact that in 
2021 Russia will take over presidency of the Arctic 
Council was equally important. Due to the role 
of the Arctic in Moscow’s policy, and to the Rus-
sian government assuring the public that it views 
protection of this ecosystem as a priority, offering 
no response to one of the biggest environmental 
disasters in the Arctic region would be tantamount 
to openly contradicting its declarations and would 
affect Russia’s status in the Council.
However, the Kremlin is trying to benefit from its 
environmental policy as much as possible, while 
disregarding the environment itself. It is forcing 
companies to boost their environmental outlays, 
but failing to create conditions that could facilitate 
the implementation of effective mechanisms for 
protecting the environment. The unprecedented 
high fine that Norilsk Nickel is required to pay is 
to be transferred directly to the federal budget, 
rather than the regional budget, which is what 
the current law in force stipulates (moreover, there 
is no guarantee that these funds will be spent on 
environmental protection). The central budget 
will de facto take over the revenue and the region 
will be left to its own devices as it struggles to 
cope with the consequences of the oil spill for 
the environment and the local population.
The cost of the environmental policy will mainly 
be borne by business. On 14 July 2020, the presi-
dent signed an act which requires oil companies 
to accumulate cash reserves on their bank ac-
counts (starting from 2021) or to take out in-
surance against any oil spills (so as to have the 
funds needed for clean-up operations). In addi-
tion, companies are expected to make an 80% 
contribution to the budget of an environmental 
protection programme President Putin has set 
as one of the priorities in his present term – he 
announced that around US$ 60 billion will be 
earmarked for that purpose by 2024. Due to the 
crisis, the programme’s implementation will likely 
be postponed until 2030 and the available funds 
will be reduced, and business itself is unwilling to 
invest in environmental protection. As a conse-
quence, the prospects of the president’s flagship 
initiative are uncertain.
In addition, the attitude of Rosprirodnadzor sug-
gests that the authorities intend not so much to 
improve the environment as to make a deal with 
business regarding the amounts of compensation. 
Key decisions were made during a confidential 
meeting between President Putin and Potanin, 
in which details were discussed regarding terms 
for paying out compensation for the disaster, in 
exchange for allowing the company to continue 
operating freely in the region. However, such prob-
The development of independent 
online media helps to reveal the 
government’s attempts to cover up 
environmental disasters and other 
problems.
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lems will likely remain unsolved. Any modernisa-
tion of a major portion of pipeline infrastructure 
and industrial plants, alongside a considerable 
reduction in pollution generated by these plants, 
would require a substantial injection of funds. 
Even during times of prosperity, the companies 
concerned had no incentive to invest in modernisa-
tion, owing to structural barriers to doing business 
in Russia. A genuine shift in the approach to these 
issues would require systemic changes, including 
an effective fight against corruption and guaran-
tees of protection of ownership rights. At present, 
the likelihood that this will happen is almost nil. 
The end of the Kremlin’s monopoly 
on information
The environmental disasters in Norilsk have once 
again revealed systemic flaws in the Russian gov-
ernance model. It is mainly based on covering 
problems up for as long as possible; once such 
problems come to light (often revealed by external 
actors), a smokescreen is created in order to reduce 
their perceived scale, while the state expresses its 
earnest commitment to resolve them. This atti-
tude on the part of the government is increasingly 
provoking comparisons with the campaign of lies 
carried out by the Soviet authorities in response 
to the Chernobyl disaster, even though the scale 
of the present crisis is incomparable with the situ-
ation back in the 1980s. The disaster in Norilsk 
has revealed a similar mechanism – initially, the 
company’s executives made attempts to cover it 
up, not only for financial reasons but also from fear 
of Moscow’s reaction. It was only when a video 
showing the oil spill was circulated on the Internet 
that the authorities offered their official reaction.
Russian officials have tried to cover up other ac-
cidents as well. These included the failed test of 
a new nuclear weapon carried out at the Nyonoksa 
missile testing site in 2019, the total number of 
Russian citizens killed in armed conflicts waged 
in foreign countries (Russian casualties were se-
cretly buried), as well as Russia’s involvement 
in aggression against Ukraine and the scale of 
the COVID-19 pandemic. The government’s ac-
tions were usually combined with disinformation 
campaigns conducted by Russian Internet trolls 
and television presenters, who were involved in 
fabricating an interpretation of events favourable 
to the Kremlin.
However, the effectiveness of propaganda has 
been dwindling, due to the public’s growing 
disenchantment with Putin’s policy and a greater 
array of independent media outlets that are break-
ing the state’s stranglehold on information. All of 
the major issues reported recently, which Mos-
cow has tried to cover up by distorting statistics 
and blocking access to information (including 
those concerning the rate of mortality due to 
COVID-19), have been the subject of numerous 
Internet podcasts and documentaries revealing 
the genuine scale of the problem and exposing 
the actions carried out by authorities. Accounts 
published by journalists and activists independ-
ent of the Kremlin attract a widespread following, 
such as the publications on Norilsk by Yelena 
Kostyuchenko from “Novaya Gazeta”. At pre-
sent, an average citizen with a mobile phone 
with Internet access poses a potential threat to 
the government, should they come across an 
important event or shoot a video on the spot 
and share it online, as was the case with Norilsk. 
The development of alternative sources of infor-
mation and the general public’s weariness with 
government propaganda are illustrated both by 
the millions of online views generated by inde-
pendent broadcasts and by Putin’s declining trust 
ratings, which now stand at 23%, less than half 
the figure reported three years ago.10
10 In November 2017, Putin was trusted by 59% of the re-
spondents. See a Levada Center survey of 30 June 2020.
